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In an opinion from which it has by now become almost banal to
quote,' Mr. Justice Brandeis uttered his famous dictum that, "There
is no federal general common law."2 That the eminent Justice
never intended this remark in any broader sense than its reading in
the full context of the opinion would indicate is clear not only from
careful examination of his entire pronouncement but also from his
own opinion in another case which he read on the same day that
he handed down his decision in Erie. In that case, Hinderlider v.
LaPlata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,3 Justice Brandeis said:
"For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between the two states is a question of 'federal common law' upon
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive." In this decision, which in the reports follows im-
mediately the Erie decision, Justice Brandeis himself recognized that
there are cases where there is a "federal common law". Nevertheless,
Justice Brandeis' dictum gave rise to no little wonder and confusion
among the lower federal courts and writers in legal periodicals. Did
it mean that the federal courts now lacked the power to "find" or
"create" (as you will) any law except as the amanuensis of a state
court, or was the decision to be less far reaching in its effect? In the
ten years since that decision, the Supreme Court has perhaps not
even yet had the opportunity to fully delineate all of the limits of
that decision or to map out in entirety the shape of the law along
the path it set, but it seems safe to say that the Court has been
sufficiently consistent in pricking out the pattern initially indicated
to foretell with some accuracy how the questions not yet decided
will be handled as they do arise.
Perhaps as good a point as any to open a discussion of the ex-
tent and limits of Erie is with the comparatively recent decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States.4 In that case, the question at issue involved a check drawn
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Editor-in-Chief, Ohio State Law Journal, 1938-39.
1See, e.g. Judge Learned Hand's lament that "I don't suppose a civil
appeal can now be argued to us without counsel sooner or later quoting
large portions of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins." Clark, State Law in the
Federal Courts, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 269 (1946).
2 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
3 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
4 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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upon the Treasurer of the United States payable to one Barner for
W. P. A. services rendered by him. The check was dated April 28,
1936, and although placed in the mail addressed to Barner, some un-
known person intercepted it, forged the payee's name and cashed it
at the store of the J. C. Penny Company in Clearfield, Pennsylvania,
which paid value in good faith. Penny endorsed the check to the
Clearfield Trust Company, which collected it from the United States
through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Shortly after
this, Barner notified his W. P. A. foreman that he had not received
the check. It was not, however, until January 12, 1937, that notice
was given the Clearfield Trust Company of the alleged forgery and
not until August 31, 1937, that it was first notified that the United
States was asking reimbursement upon the check. Suit was brought
by the United States against the Clearfield Trust on November 16,
1939, and the J. C. Penny Company subsequently intervened. The
district court held that the rights of the parties were to be de-
termined by the law of Pennsylvania and that since the United
States unreasonably delayed in giving notice of the forgery to the
Clearfield Trust Company, it was barred from recovery under the
Pennsylvania decisions. Although the district court's decision is
not reported, it apparently decided the case upon the authority of
United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York.5
5 293 U.S. 340 (1934). This case was also relied on by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in the case of Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. United
States, 103 F. 2d 188, (C.C.A. 9th 1939), as a basis for finding, in 'a case
substantially similar on its facts to the Clearfield case, that they were
bound to follow the law of California. The Guaranty Trust case involved
a U.S. Government check which was mailed from Washington, D. C. to the
payee in Yugoslavia, but was intercepted in Yugoslavia, the payee's en-
dorsement forged and the check cashed by a Yugoslavian bank. In due
course the check was presented to the Guaranty Trust. That institution
paid the check and in turn was paid by the Federal Reserve Bank and the
check was then honored by the Treasury. When the forgery was discovered,
the United States sued the Guaranty Trust, basing its claims on two princi-
pal grounds: (1) that the title to the check was never transferred by the
forged endorsement, and (2) that the Guaranty Trust, having dealt with
the Federal Reserve, was bound by its regulations and those of the Treasury
to have the check charged back against it, if the Treasury chose to charge
it back to the Federal Reserve. The first question the Supreme Court de-
cided in favor of Guaranty on the basis of conflicts, applying the law of
Yugoslavia under which title to the check did pass even though the en-
dorsement was forged. It is on this point alone that the Supreme Court
and the Third Circuit distinguished this decision in the Clearfield case.
Justice Brandeis, in the Guaranty case, however, had decided the second
point in the case against the Government on the ground that since it was
the Government itself rather than the Federal Reserve which was suing,
no agency relationship existed and, therefore, no consent by Guaranty to
be bound by the regulations could be worked out. It was at this point
that Justice Brandeis made the statement which caused the Ninth Circuit
in the Security-First National case, supra, and presumably the District
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The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however,
after distinquishing the Guaranty case, stated the question as being
whether with these facts under the Erie rule they were constrained
to look to the law as declared by the state courts.'
Having posed the problem, the Third Circuit then proceeded to
decide that Erie was inapplicable and that they were, therefore, not
bound to follow the state decisions.7
Having thus avoided the Pennsylvania rule, the Third Circuit
then decided that under the appropriate federal decisions, delay in
giving notice of forgery is only a defense to an endorsee under a
forged endorsement where there is a showing that the endorsee
suffered loss as a result of the delay. There being no such showing
here, the holding was against the Trust Company.
A clear conflict thus being presented between the Third Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit in Security-First National Bank v. United
States" the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then affirmed the
Third Circuit. The Court adopted the circuit court's reasoning all
along the line and expanded on the Erie point by stating that since
the authority to issue the check stemmed from the Constitution and
statutes of the United States, state law had no application and "In
absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts
to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own
standards."'0
The Court then considered the advisability of selecting the state
law as the federal rule, even though not obliged to do so by the
Erie rule, but felt that in a case involving the issuance by the
United States of its own commercial paper the benefits attendant
upon the Government's being able to follow one uniform rule when
Court in the Clearfield case to stub their toes; he said: "As against the
United States, the rights of the holder of its checks drawn upon the Treas-
urer are the same as those accorded by commercial practice to the checks
of private individuals." Justice Brandeis undoubtedly meant merely that
the government could not by regulation set up special rules for itself and
thereby bind all who dealt with its paper, but the intervening Erie deci-
sion apparently convinced these lower courts that he meant that the "com-
mercial practice" referred to was necessarily that determined by the local
law.
United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F. 2d 93, 94 (C.C.A. 3d
1942).
7 The Third Circuit, although implying that Erie, in their opinion, was
limited to diversity cases, expressly refused to base their decision on that
ground, saying that in the absence of a Supreme Court decision to that
effect, they would be guilty of uncalled for temerity in taking such a
position.
8 103 F. 2d 188 (C.C.A. 9th 1939). See Note 5 supra.




acting in a civil or contracting capacity far outweighed anything to
be gained from adopting state law as the federal rule in such cases.:1
Where does the Clearfield case fit into the pattern of the Erie
case and its descendants? It is probable that the Erie case had no ap-
plication to the problem presented in Clearfield for a reason addi-
tional to that given by the Supreme Court in distinguishing the two
cases, but before submitting any such thesis, let us attempt to see
Erie in its proper perspective after ten years by examining some of
the subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing with the applicability
or non-applicability of state law.
The cases can perhaps be classified into the following categories:
I. Cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship and in which no problem is raised involving the Con-
stitution or statutes of the United States.
II. Cases which involve the civil rights, interests or legal rela-
tions of the United States as a party to the action.
III. Cases which do not involve the civil rights, interests or
legal relations of the United States as a party, but in which the
jurisdiction of the federal court is based on a federal statute.
IV. Cases in which the basis of the jurisdiction of the federal
court is diversity of citizenship or cases which arise in a state court
where a question is raised involving the Constitution or a federal
statute.
I. Cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of
!tizenship and in which no problem is raised involving the Constitu-
lion or statutes of the United States.
The confusion apparent among the lower courts in ascertain-
ing the limits of Erie with respect to the-absence of a "federal com-
mon law" has also manifested itself in the application of the Erie
rule to strictly diversity of citizenship cases. Shades of Swift v.
Tyson as well as the inherent difficulty in determining the case law
"Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unanimous Court, stummed up
this point of view at page 367 of the opinion: "In our choice of the appli-
cable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law. See Royal In-
demnity Co. v. United States, supra. But reasons which may make state
law at times the appropriate federal rule are singularly inappropriate here.
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale
and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly
occur in several states. The application of state law, even without the
conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of
the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries
of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is
plain. And while the federal law merchant, developed for about a century
under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, represented general commer-
cial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to protect a federal
right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for fashion-
ing federal rules applicable to these federal questions."
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of a given state, lacking a controlling decision of the highest court
of the state, led numerous lower courts to conclude that the Erie
doctrine should be restricted to those situations which involved
traditional substantive law and where the highest court of the state
had spoken on the subject. In cases not falling within these two
categories, the federal courts did not consider themselves bound
by state case law and decided the issue presented upon "general
law" or their own conception of what the state law was. Viewed
in retrospect, however, it is fairly clear that the Supreme Court
meant the Erie decision to stand for the proposition that in diversity
cases the federal courts must follow the law of the state except in
matters of pleading and of those involving the administration of
the federal judiciary machinery.12
In fairness to such lower courts, however, Mr. Justice Brandeis'
references to the "substantive rules of common law applicable in a
state" and the law of the state declared "by its highest court in a
decision" left the federal tribunals without sufficient guideposts to
discover the mandate of the Supreme Court with respect to the
application of state law and, in fact, gave implied support to their
position. Traditionally, the legal principles involved in a number
of the cases following Erie, upon which the decision of the court
turned, were procedural in nature. A literal interpretation of
Justice Brandeis' opinion freed the lower courts, in their opinion,
from applying the state law in such instances. Likewise, where the
highest court of the state had not passed upon a specific subject, the
trial and intermediate courts believed that they were at liberty to
determine for themselves what the applicable law was. Not only the
time honored prerogative under Swift v. Tyson of deciding what the
law is but also undoubtedly an inarticulated feeling that they were
abdicating their judicial functions to other tribunals caused the
courts to construe strictly the Erie decision and to fail to forsee the
implications of the Erie case in their true light. Two recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court"8 give the cue to the extent to which
federal courts sitting in diversity cases must follow state law. Prior
to discussing these cases and as introduction to an understanding of
them, although many writers have thoroughly covered the field,14
12Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (pleading); Hardie v.
Bryson, 44 F. Supp. 67, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1942) (refusing to apply state law as
to immunity of non-resident party from service in state action in attend-
ance at federal court in state); Restrictions of federal equitable jurisdiction
as well as constitutional guarantees may also limit or vary the relief af-
forded in federal courts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105
(1945).
13 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); King v. Order of
United Commercial Travelers, 68 Sup. Ct. 488 (1948) discussed infra. p. 277.




it may be profitable to discuss briefly the cases decided by the
Supreme Court in which it has been held that the federal courts,
under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, must follow state law.
These cases fall into three general categories, viz: (1) sub-
stance versus procedure, (2) conflict of laws and (3) the applicable
state law. The lower courts, generally, avoided the necessity of
following the state law in the first class of cases by declaring the
legal principles involved to be matters of procedure jin which the
federal courts were free to adopt their own rule of law. 5 Likewise,
in another series of cases several circuit courts of appeals held that,
lacking a decision of the highest state court on the subject they
could determine for themselves what the state law was.1 6
In the first case to come before the Supreme Court in the sub-
stantive-procedural field the court held that the federal courts must
follow the law of the state as to burden of proof.' Under the state
law the burden rested upon the party attacking the legal title of a
bona fide purchaser. This protection, afforded by the local law, the
court said, "relates to a substantial right upon which the holder of re-
corded title ... may confidently rely.... This was a valuable assur-
ance in favor of its title." '18 Similarly, the Supreme Court held that
the federal courts must apply the local law as to contributory negli-
gence and as to the statute of limitations even in equity actions. 19
Uncertainty nevertheless surrounds any given problem in this
category until decided by the Supreme Court, no matter how pre-
dictable the outcome may be. An interesting problem in this field
upon which the Supreme Court has not spoken directly is the ex-
tent to which federal courts are bound to follow the local law with
respect to the direction of a verdict. Quite a few cases take the
position that the matter of direction of the verdict "goes to the very
essence of the exercise of the judicial function by the federal courts,
and is in no sense a matter of local law. -2 ° But logically if the state
'5 See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. 2d 503, 521 (C.C.A. 2d 1944);
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 101 F. 2d 314, 316 (C.C.A. 5th 1939).
'6 See note 39 infra.
17 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939).
18 Id. at 212.
9 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (contributory negligence);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (statute of limitations).
20 Gorham v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n, 114 F. 2d 97,
99 (C.C.A. 4th 1940) cert. denied, 312 U.S. 688 (1941); McSweeny v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 128 F. 2d 660 (C.C.A. 4th 1942) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658
(1942); Zauderer v. Continental Cas. Co., 140 F. 2d 211 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).
Contra: Clay County Cotton v. Home Life Ins. Co., 113 F. 2d 856
(C.C.A. 8th 1940). Lennig v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F. 2d 871 (C.C.A.
3d 1941). Cooper v. Brown, 126 F 2d 874 (C.C.A. 3d 1942). Waldron v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 141 F. 2d 230 (C.C.A. 3d 1944). Laxton
v. Hatzel & Buehler Inc., 142 F. 2d 913 (C.C.A. 6th 1944). Detroit Edison
Co. v. Knowles, 152 F. 2d 422 (C.C.A. 6th 1945). Cf. Goodall Co. v. Sortin,
141 F. 2d 427 (C.C.A. 6th 1944).
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-- law governs burden of proof and presumptions 21 then it follows that
the rules with respect to taking a case from the jury must also be
so governed..2 2 The question of the sufficiency of the evidence to al-
low the cause to go to the jury or direct the verdict was before the
Supreme Court in Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 23 but the ruling
in that case does not clarify the problem in its entirety although
it has been cited by some intermediate courts for the proposition
that the sufficiency of the evidence must be determined by state
law.24 In the Stoner case the Court reversed the circuit court of
appeals for affirming a directed verdict where an intermediate
state court had decided in a prior case involving the same parties,
issues and substantially the same evidence that the evidence was
sufficient to take the case to the jury. But this decision might well
be regarded as an application of the doctrine of the "law of the
case."' ' It would be unwise, however, to invite the conclusion that
the cases in the lower courts are diametrically opposed in this situa-
tion. A majority of the cases in which the Erie doctrine was fol-
lowed turned partly upon the question of what facts are necessary
to constitute a cause of action or upon the requisite degree of
proof.2 16 In the line of decisions which refused to follow Erie there
21 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 106 F. 2d 375 (C.C.A. 9th
1939) cert. denied, 308 U.S. 621 (1939), which followed state statute as to
weight to be accorded presumptions.
22 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 289
(1946). Judge Clark also suggests that logically "even the so carefully
cherished right of 'comment' on the evidence may be either lost or greatly
limited." Would the federal courts admit that "comment" on the evidence
will "lead to a substantially different result"? See Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
23311 U.S. 464 (1940).
21See Lenning v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F. 2d 871, 872 (C.C.A.
3rd 1941), supra, note 20.
223 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 24 (Supp. 1947).
26 Thus, in Laxton v. Hatzel & Buehler, Inc., 142 F. 2d 913, 916 (C.C.A.
6th 1944) the court said: "We think that the directed verdict was proper.
We need not consider the rule of res ipsa loquitur because it is not ac-
cepted in the courts of Michigan. Before appellant was entitled to have his
case submitted to the jury, he was required to introduce substantial proof
...." And in Clay County Cotton Co. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 113 F. 2d 856,
861 (C.C.A. 3d 1940) an action to recover an accidental death benefit, "The
question presented by the motion to direct a verdict was whether a cause
of action had been proved, which clearly is a question of substantive law
and the state law applied." In Lennig v. New York Life Ins. Co., 122 F. 2d
871 (C.C.A. 3d 1941) the court held, following Pennsylvania law, that
where evidence produced showed death was caused by external and violent
means that an inference arose that the death was accidental sufficient to
take case to jury, Cf. McCrate v. Morgan Packing Co., 117 F. 2d 702 (C.C.A.
6th 1941) reversing the trial court for charging contributory negligence




was no indication that a different result would have obtained in the
state courts, a fact which the courts were careful to point out. If
the policy inherent in Erie is that the result be the same whether
the action is tried in the state or federal court, will not, and should
not, the federal courts be governed by the state law as to directed
verdicts where that rule substantially affects the litigant's rights.2 7
The intermediate courts in the first two conflict of laws cases
which have been decided by the Supreme Court assumed without
reference to Erie that the conflicts rule to be applied was that of the
federal courts.28 Consistent with the theory of uniformity of result,
however, the Supreme Court reversed both cases, holding that the
law of the state of the forum governs the federal courts in the choice
of the applicable state law. In the first case, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co.,20 the Supreme Court held that in an action for breach
of a New York contract the federal court sitting in Delaware was
required to follow the Delaware conflicts rule dealing with the
interest to be awarded upon recovery.30 In the other case, Griffin v.
McCoach,31 the personal representatives sued' the insurance company
on a New York policy in 4 district court in Texas, the company
interpleading the assignees of the policy who had paid the pre-
miums. The Court held that the conflict rule of Texas controlled
and that a beneficiary without an insurable interest could not col-
lect upon it since Texas could, as contrary to its public policy, de-
cline to enforce such a contract. The purpose of this paper is to
block out the amplifications and limitations of Erie and it is beyond
its scope to criticize or question the applicability of the rule in a
given situation, particularly in the field of conflict of laws. Yet,
the temptation is such that it is difficult in passing not to mention
at least two of the many interesting questions which the conflicts
problems present. The one is present in the McCoach case.3 2 The
27 That the Erie doctrine restricts the powers of the trial court to
comment on the evidence, grant a new trial or that practically a litigant
will be deprived of a jury trial where he otherwise would be so entitled in
federal court is highly doubtful. See Morgan, Choice of Law Governing
Proof, 58 HARv. L. REv. 153, 176 (1944).
28 Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F. 2d 268 (C.C.A. 3d 1940);
Griffin v. McCoach, 116 F. 2d 261 (C.C.A. 5th 1940). See CooK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 108 (1942).
2 0313 U.S. 487 (1941).
o Id. at 496 "Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between
federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system,
which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the
right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors."
31313 U.S. 498 (1941).
32 313 U.S. 498 (1941). While under certain circumstances the state
may because of public policy refuse to lend the aid of its courts to the en-
forcement of rights acquired outside its borders, it may not under consti-
tutional limitations "abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders hav-
ing no relation to anything done or to be done within them." Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick,- 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930).
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other is the problem confronting a federal court when the law of
several states may be involved, e.g., in unfair competition cases. 33
In the McCoach case if the assignees had sued in New York or in
New Jersey, the home office of the insurance company, undoubtedly
a contrary result would have obtained. Is this not the type of forum
shopping which the Erie doctrine was fashioned to prevent?34 On
the other hand, if litigants under our federal system5 have sub-
jected themselves to the jurisdiction of more than one state court
should they thereby be permitted to assert prejudice because the
suit was brought in state Y instead of state X? Why then upon this
calculated risk which they have assumed should the result be varied
in the federal courts?36
33 See infra p. 303.
3 See Clark, State Law in The Federal Courts, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 287
(1946).
35 See quotation from Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941). Note 30 supra.
30 Had the McCoach case been litigated in the courts of Texas, the
personal representatives would have recovered. Forum shopping among
states and federal courts sitting in different states is available where juris-
diction may be obtained in all situations arising under Erie. What then is
the solution, if one is desired, in this area of forum shopping still open to
parties since for practical purposes the door has been closed in federal
courts? Notoriously, cases have been laid in one jurisdiction or another in
anticipation of a different result, not only in like instances to the classical
example of Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) but in others, not the least of
which is the enticement of a larger verdict. While equality is the aim of
the law, diligence and resourcefulness continue to be rewarded, breaking
out in another direction as the traveled way is barred.
One partial solution which has been offered in diversity cases is that
the federal courts adopt the doctrine of the inconvenient forum to tempor-
ize the outcome and limit the choice of available forums. This discretionary
rule of forum non conveniens has recently been applied by the Supreme
Court in two five-to-four decisions on cases brought in the federal court
in New York. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the Court
reversed the circuit court, holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing a suit brought by a resident of Virginia in a fed-
eral district court in New York City against a Pennsylvania corporation
qualified to do business in New York and Virginia for a loss by fire to
plaintiff's property in Virginia. Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
330 U.S. 518 (1947) likewise affirmed the application of the doctrine by
the district court in a derivative suit brought in New York by a policy-
holder and citizen of that state against an Illinois mutual insurance com-
pany alleging breach of trust and praying for an accounting. Practically,
however, the area in which the doctrine may be applied is quite limited.
Moreover, the Erie rule may require the federal courts to apply the forum
non conveniens rule of the forum state. The Supreme Court in these cases
refused to decide whether state law was controlling since under New York
law the result would have been the same. The Second Circuit held in the
Gilbert and Koster cases that the federal courts are not bound to follow
state rules in respect to discretionary declination of jurisdiction. Judge
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More troublesome, perhaps, than whether an issue is to be
governed by state law is the situation presented where the state
law on that issue is confused, non-existent or the only expression
to be found on the subject is an intermediate or trial court decision.
Resentment on the part of the judges of the lower federal courts,
not unnatural in a specific case, flows from a feeling that they are
abdicating their judicial functions and prostituting their intellectual
capacities when forced by the Erie rule to follow "a rigid wooden
decision on the theory that it is required of (them) by law. '37 This
attitude is summed up by Judge Clark in referring to the "mystic
line" dividing procedure and substance "past which we dare not
venture without state tutelage."' 8 Thus, the federal appellate courts
in the first four cases to reach the Supreme Court concluded that
where the law had not been determined by the state court of last
resort that they were not bound by the pronouncements of lower
Swan, who spoke for the majority in the Koster case, and Judge Chase con-
curred with Judge Learned Hand in Weiss v. Routh, 159 F. 2d 193, 195
(C.C.A. 2d 1945) in which Judge Hand said, "we are to remember the pur-
pose of conformity in 'diversity cases.' It is that the accident of citizenship
shall not change the outcome; a purpose which extends as much to deter-
mining whether the court shall act at all, as to how it shall decide, if it
does. For this reason it seems to us that we should follow the New York
decisions." Judge Clark, in the Gilbert decision, differentiated the Weiss
case on the theory that the question of the internal management of a for-
eign corporation was "much nearer substantive law." Forum shopping
being one of the prices that must be paid for our dual system of govern-
ment, isn't it reasonable to limit it to the state court area? In view of the
Erie doctrine, why should the federal courts allow a suit to be maintained
where the only basis of jurisdiction is the fact that the defendant is amen-
able to service, where the only reason for bringing the action in the federal
court is the hope of obtaining a more favorable result through the laws
of the state of the forum or otherwise and where the courts of the state
of the forum in their discretion would decline jurisdiction? Perhaps the
more effective solution to forum shopping, although much more difficult,
if not impossible of attainment, is to cut through the traditional concepts
of substance and procedure in the field of conflict of laws and work to an
adoption generally of the rule of modern courts, i.e. the law of the locus is
to be applied to all matters of substance, and to all matters of procedure
which are likely to vary substantially the outcome of the litigation, in the
absence of a contrary policy, the objective being to obtain the same result
in the forum which would have resulted in the courts of the locus. Morgan,
Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HAav. L. Rv. 153, 194-195 (1944). The
failure of the theory behind Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842), to obtain
uniformity of substantive law through adoption by the state courts of the
federal rule precipitated the Erie doctrine. But Erie points the way to a
less odious objective, namely uniformity of result by ignoring "form" for
"substance."
37 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 291-292
(1946).
38 Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F. 2d 883, 885 (C.C.A. 2d 1946), supra
note 36.
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state courts." The Supreme Court in turn reversed the circuit
courts of appeals. Its decisions in these and subsequent cases out-
line the circumstances under which the federal courts must follow
the law of the state as announced by the lower state courts.
The Supreme Court in three of these cases held that it is the
duty of the federal court to ascertain the state law from all available
evidence and to follow the rule of law announced by an inter-
mediate state appellate court unless convinced by other persuasive
evidence that the state court of last resort would decide otherwise. 0
Although not determinative of the decisions, the state supreme
courts in all three cases refused to review the decisions of the appel-
late courts.41
In the fourth case, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field4 2 the Court
held that the federal court in New Jersey was bound by two
decisions of the chancery trial court. The Court went to some
length to point out that the rulings of the Court of Chancery of
New Jersey carried considerably more weight than that of the ordi-
nary trial court; that such rulings were ordinarily treated as bind-
ing in later cases; that when they are uniform over a course of years
they are seldom set aside; and that the court of chancery was com-
parable to the intermediate appellate courts on the law side. There
was no indication in the Court's opinion that the federal courts
would be bound by the ruling of every trial court's decision as to
the applicable state law as has been thought by some of the lower
courts. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers43 has settled
that problem at least in part.
The question in the King case was whether deceased's death
resulted from participation in aviation within the meaning of that
exclusion clause in the policy of insurance on which the action was
founded. King, the deceased, lost his life following an emergency
landing of a Civil Air Patrol airplane thirty miles off the coast of
North Carolina. He was not seriously hurt from the landing and
was still alive over two hours later; but when picked up some four
and half hours after the landing he was dead. The medical diag-
nosis was "drowning as a result of exposure in the water." On these
facts a common pleas court ruled against a different insurer on a
39 West v. American T. & T. Co., 108 F. 2d 347 (C.C.A. 6th 1939); Field
v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F. 2d 521 (C.C.A. 3d 1939); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109 F. 2d 874 (C.C.A. 8th 1940); Six Companies of Cali-
fornia v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 110 F. 2d 620 (C.C.A. 9th 1940).
40 Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180
(1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Stoner v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
41 See King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 68 Sup. Ct. 488,
491 (1948), note 13 supra.
42 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
43 68 Sup. Ct. 488 (1948).
[Vol. 9
ERIE RAILROAD
substantially similar policy relying in part on the decision of the
district court in the King case. The circuit court in reversing the
district court held that the decision of the common pleas court was
not controlling and proceeded to determine what the Supreme Court
of South Carolina would probably rule in a similar situation. Speak-
ing for the Court in affirming the circuit court of appeals r. Chief
Justice Vinson took pains to point out the apparently little weight
accorded common pleas decisions in South Carolina's own courts.
The Chief Justice cautiously remarked, however:
. . .we are deciding only that the Circuit Court of
Appeals did not have to follow the decision of the Court of
Common Pleas for Spartanburg County. We do not pur-
port to determine the correctness of its ruling on the merits.
Nor is our decision to be taken as promulgating a general
rule that federal courts need never abide by determinations
of state law by state trial courts.44
The criticisms which stem from this phase of the Erie doctrine,
however, have not been solved by the Supreme Court in its decisions
following Erie. The first, already referred to, decries the stifling of
the federal courts in performing their judicial function of interpret-
ing the state case law and statutes, forcing the courts to follow a
formalistic pattern of adopting as the law the decision of an inter-
mediate appellate or trial court.45 The other involves the depriva-
tion of the litigants' right to persuade the state courts not to follow
a decision of the inferior state courts"' and even the court of last
resort to reverse its prior ruling.4 7 But in the vast majority of the
cases these perplexing problems do not arise and the federal courts
are determining state law in the manner in which courts normally
decide cases.48 The emphasis, perhaps, is best placed on the effectu-
ation of the policy of the Erie doctrine.
The Erie doctrine requires the federal courts to follow the state
law. State law, within the limits already discussed, is to be ascer-
tained from all available data. Nonexistence or uncertainty of state
law does not justify the federal courts to dismiss the case without
prejudice to proceed in the state courts to secure a determination
of the questions of state law involved."9 Unless some principle or
"Id. at 493.
45 Clark, supra note 37.
46 Judge Allen in West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 39 at
350 said: "While it, (the decision of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga
County) of course, has persuasive force, it is not binding on the court of
appeals for the other 87 counties of Ohio."
4z 59 HARV. L. REv. 1299 (1946).
48 Clark, supra note 37.
49 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
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policy requires the federal courts to decline equity jurisdiction"0 it
is their duty to decide all questions of state law in diversity cases.'
Viewed in the light of the theory behind the Erie doctrine the
decisions of the Supreme Court are consistent and sound. To avoid
a substantially different result and discrimination against the citi-
5oThe Supreme Court in Meredith v. Winter Haven, supra note 49,
recognized that equity jurisdiction may be withheld and state determina-
tion of the question involved sought or required, for example where ad-
judication in the federal court would interfere with the collection of state
taxes or fiscal affairs of the state, or the domestic policy of the state govern-
ing its administrative agencies. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaugh-
lin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) is an example of the first class in which the Court
remanded the case to the district court to retain the bill pending a con-
struction of the state statute by the state courts. Cf. A. F. of L. v. Watson,
327 U.S. 582 (1946). In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), an
example of the second class, the Court reversed the court of appeals and
affirmed the district court dismissing the complaint, refusing to enjoin the
order of State Railroad Commission of Texas permitting the drilling of
oil wells separated by distance less than the minimum prescribed. While
jurisdiction in both cases did not depend on diversity, federal questions
were involved. Mr. Justice Black said "a federal equity court . . . may,
in its sound discretion, whether its jurisdiction is invoked on the ground
of diversity of citizenship or otherwise, 'refuse to enforce or protect legal
rights the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest' for
it 'is in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise
their discretionary power with proper regard for the rightful independence
of state government in carrying out their domestic policy.'" Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., supra at 317-318. Uncertainty concerning the meaning of the local
law may not be the only criterion for determining whether in its discretion
the federal court will refuse jurisdiction leaving the moving party the
alternative of obtaining a state authoritative ruling. The federal court may
be justified in retaining jurisdiction where there is also uncertainty sur-
rounding the adequacy of the state remedy. See Hillsborough v. Cromwell,
326 U.S. 620, 628 (1945). Because of the rule that where the local law is
in doubt, i.e. the proper interpretation of a state statute has not been de-
cided by authoritative state decision and a federal constitutional question
turns upon such an interpretation, the federal court will hold the case
until such determination is made by the state courts, the lawyer is in
somewhat of a quandry. If he starts initially in the state courts he may
have to rely solely on an appeal to the Supreme Court for a ruling in his
favor on the federal question. He cannot start over in the federal courts
for a decision on the merits in the state courts will be res adjudicata to a
subsequent diversity action in the federal courts. Angel v. Bullington, 330
U.S. 183 (1947). To assure himself of a decision in the federal courts on
the federal question he is forced to start the action in the federal courts
and at some stage in the proceedings having the case remanded to the
district court to be held pending a determination of the local law in the
state courts.
51 "Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, did not free the federal courts
from the duty of deciding questions of state law in diversity cases. Instead
it placed on them a greater responsibility for determining and applying
state laws in all cases within their jurisdiction in which federal law does
not govern." Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943).
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zens of a state 2 it is the duty of the federal courts to apply the law
as it exists at the time of decision either in the trial court or on
appeal.5 3
Thus a contrary conclusion in the West and Stoner cases54
would give the losing party an opportunity in a diversity case to
avoid the adverse decision of the state court where the case was
remanded for further proceedings by relitigating the same issue
between the same parties in the federal court. In the Six Companies
case, the decision of the intermediate appellate court had, without
disapproval, remained as the only expression of the state law for
over twenty years.55 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field" has provoked con-
siderable critical comment particularly since the circuit court's
opinion has been cited approvingly by other vice-chancellors of
New Jersey in departing from the prior cases which the Supreme
Court held were binding on the federal courts.5 7 It may be of sig-
nificance that the point of law involved in the Fidelity case was the
construction of a New Jersey statute. In such cases, the Supreme
Court has followed a policy of looking to intermediate state court
decisions for statutory interpretation. 8 But the fact remains that
the decisions of the court of chancery in the Fidelity case were
the only authoritative expressions of the state law at the time it
was decided. Conceivably, it may be to the advantage of a litigant,
in an isolated case, to start or remove a case to federal court where
it appears that the ruling of the state intermediate court may be
seriously questioned. On the other hand, to suggest that the state
precedent might not be followed is in the main to admit that such a
state decision would not be controlling in the federal courts.55 That
the federal courts are not required to follow "blindly" the ruling
of any and all intermediate courts including nisi prius is inherent in
the King decision.65  Considerable latitude is given to the lower
federal courts within the framework of the court's decisions to de-
5ZSee Angel v. Bullington, supra note 50.
53 "Until such time as a case is no longer sut judice, the duty rests
upon federal courts to apply state law under the Rules of Decision statute
in accordance with the then controlling decision of the highest state court."
Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941). Cf. Huddleston
v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944).
51 Supra note 40.
r5 Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180,
188 (1940).
56 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
57 Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 292
(1946).
58 Russel v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940).
59 E.g., where the state rule is based upon an outmoded federal law.
Breisch v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, 312 U.S. 484 (1941).
60 King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 68 Sup. Ct. 488, 491
(1948).
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termine what the state law is. Where the courts have decided on
the basis of the state law that the decision of a lower state court
is not controlling either because of the standing or the court or
convincing evidence to the contrary the Supreme Court will prob-
ably leave the result undisturbed.61
The iniquities, if they are such, which have been said might
follow from the application in diversity cases of the pronounce-
ments of intermediate and lower state courts are minor when con-
sidered in the light of the "evils" which the Erie doctrine was
fashioned to prevent. "The nub of the policy" is that for the same
issues in a federal court sitting in effect as "another court of the
State", the accident of citizenship "should not lead to a substantially
different result."62 The purpose is effectuated where the federal
court approximates "as closely as may be State law in order to
vindicate without discrimination a right derived solely from a
State. 63
The influence of the Erie decision did not stop with those cases
in which it was meant to apply, i.e., where jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship. The doctrine carried over and state law
was followed by many of the lower federal courts in a number of
the cases which are discussed in the succeeding sections of this
paper.
II. Cases which involve the civil rights, interests or legal re-
lations of the United State& as a party to the action.
The Supreme Court's answer to the problem posed by this sec-
tion has been foreshadowed by the prior discussion of the Clearfeld
case.
6 4
This type of case has, in the past, however, caused some con-
cern and confusion among the lower federal courts. Some of these
courts have felt that even in matters where the federal government
was involved in a civil action, Erie dictated that unless a provision
of the Constitution or a particular federal statute expressly covered
the specific matter in question, state law must govern. Thus the
Ninth Circuit in the case of Alameda County v. United States,65
which involved a suit by the United States for specific performance
of a contract for the operation of certain bridges, entered into be-
- See MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Ass. Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281
(1942). In Huddleston v. Dwyer, supra note 53, at 237 the court said
"ordinarily we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional
cases, the considered determination of questions of state law by the inter-
mediate federal appellate courts, . . ." See also quotation from King v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, supra, p. 277.
62 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-109 (1945).
63 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
64 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
65 124 F. 2d 611 (C.C.A. 9th 1941).
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tween the Secretary of War and Alameda County, California, felt
bound by Erie to apply California law. The court dismissed the
contention of the United States that federal law should apply, be-
cause the origin of its rights in the premises derived first from its
Constitutional power over navigable waters and "secondly through
enactment of the Act of 1910." As to the Constitutional provision,
the court said that nothing in the Constitution purports to put any
obligation on the county to maintain any bridge. Such an obligation
if present came from the contract and not from the Constitution.
As to the statute, the conclusion of the court was, "Regarding the
statute in question, there is nothing in it which confers on appellee
any right against appellant." 6
In other words, the Ninth Circuit took the position that unless
the Federal Constitution or a federal statute deals specifically with
the matter under consideration, Efi-e requires the federal courts to
follow the state law.
In another case also involving a contract of the United States,
in this case a suit by a contractor against the United States for
breach of contract, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided, by
merely stating it as a principle, that Erie forced them to determine
the matter in accordance with the law of the state of the forum67
Several other lower court cases have, however, gone the other
way. In Kolker v. United States, 68 Judge Coleman said flatly: "But
in a case involving the construction of such government contracts,
local law is not controlling".
The interpretation of Erie expressed in the Alameda County
line of cases is perhaps open to question on the basis of Brandeis'
own express exception 8 as well as on the ground that they were
not diversity cases.
There is, however, a further and perhaps even stronger reason
running through the thinking in this type of case as to why Erie
66 Id. at 616.
67United States v. Brookridge Farm, 111 F. 2d 461 (C.C.A. 10th 1940).
6840 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Md. 1941). The "such contracts" referred to
were building projects being conducted by the Department of Agriculture.
Similarly decided were United States v. Grogan, 39 F. Supp. 819 (D. Mon-
tana 1941) (involving an action by the United States to enforce a construc-
tion contract) and Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D.
Cal. 1940) (involving a seller's action in federal court against United
States, on a contract made in the District of Columbia for sale of pumps and
holding that a clause providing for liquidated damages was enforceable
un ede principlas irrespeet i: ot E.-ie and irrespective of actual
damages, notwithstanding the law of California whereby such clauses would
not be conclusive).
69 'Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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does not apply and why state law should be followed sparingly, if
at all. This reason, later to be articulated by the Supreme Court
in the Clearfield and other decisions, was early suggested by Judge
Yankwich in Byron Jackson v. United States, when he pointed out
that the United States Government should not, in its contractual
undertakings, be subjected, in determinations as to their validity,
to the law of forty-eight different states. Rather, the contracting
agencies should be entitled to rely on one uniform rule.7 °
Although the Alameda County case was decided as late as 1941,
the Supreme court as early as 1939, the year after the decision in
the Erie case, had already decided that this type of case was an
exception to the Erie doctrine. In Board of Commissioners v. United
States,7 the Supreme Court by implication rejected the doctrine
later to be expressed in the Alameda County case, and pointed
toward their adoption of Judge Yankwich's philosophy. In the
Board of Commissioners case, an act*n was brought by the United
States in behalf of one of its Indian wards for taxes unlawfully
paid. In 1861 the United States had made a treaty with the Potta-
watomie Indians which provided that lands held by the United
States in trust for the Pottawatomie Indians were "exempt from
taxation", etc. The lands in questions here were so held, but in
1918 the Secretary of the Interior, over the objection of this Indian,
had cancelled her trust patent and issued instead a fee simple pat-
ent; in consequence, Jackson County, where the land was located,
began to subject the land to its regular property taxes. Later Con-
gress authorized the cancellation of fee simple patents issued over
the objection of the allottees and the United States began these
proceedings to recover for its Indian ward the taxes paid to Jackson
County. The district court gave judgment for the taxes and also
for six percent interest. Under Kansas law a taxpayer may not re-
cover from a county, interest upon taxes wrongfully collected. The
question on appeal was the allowance of the interest. The county
urged upon the court that the Erie case bound the district court
to follow the Kansas decisions and disallow the interest. The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court, although disallowing the interest be-
cause to allow it here would be inequitable, declined to base their
decision on the Kansas decisions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for the court, said, "Since the origin of the right to be enforced is
the Treaty, plainly whatever rule we fashion is ultimately attribu-
table to the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the-nited States,
and does not owe its authority to the law-making agencies of
Kansas.,7 2
70 Supra note 68 at 667.
71 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
72 Id. at 349.
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This doctrine, however, does not mean that state law will never
be followed in such a case, but if it is, it is because the federal court
believes, as a matter of policy, that the best federal rule in a par-
ticular case would be the adoption of the applicable state rule as a
matter of federal law. This, of course, is completely different from
the Erie command.
In Royal Indemnity v. United States7 3 for example, the appro-
priate measure of damage, expressed in terms of interest, for de-
layed payment of a contractual obligation to the United States was
before the Court. There was no applicable federal statute and the
Court declared that in that case it was up to the federal courts them-
selves to fix the appropriate rate. The Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Stone, said, in effect, that in such a case the federal courts
would determine the answer in accordance with their own criteria.7 4
The majority then decided to adopt as the federal rule the rate
of interest prevailing in the state where the obligation was given
and to be performed, in this case New York. The dissent, written
by Mr. Justice Black and concurred in by Justices Murphy and
Douglas, felt that the subjection of federal obligors to varying
rates of interest dependent upon where they resided was unfor-
tunate and they felt that the rate of interest should be uniform
and that the Court should set it at a lower figure than the six per-
cent which was the statutory New York rate.7
5
It was in the Clearfield Trust"8 case, previously discussed, that
the Court gave its most articulate exposition, up to that time, of this
limitation to the Erie doctrine.77
In 1947, the Court finally had before it the question of a con-
tract entered into by an agency of the federal government where
the statute authorizing the contract is silent on the particular point
73313 U.S. 289 (1941).
4 Id. at 296.
75In U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 315 U.S. 289 (1942), the Court
avoided the question of whether Erie would compel the application of local
law to contracts of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. It would seem
reasonably clear, however, from the cases discussed above that if the Court
were forced to a decision of that point it would decide that such contracts,
being contractual obligations of the United States, would be governed by
federal rather than state law. See discussion of Priebe & Sons v. United
States, infra, p. 294.
76318 U.S. 363 (1943).
7 7 1n National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945),
the court flatly reaffirmed the Clearfield decision in a case involving some-
what similar facts. It is a matter of perhaps passing interest that Mr.
Justice Douglas, who wrote the opinion of the Court in the Clearfield case,
merely concurred in the result in the Metropolitan Bank decision, but gave
no reasons for his apparent disagreement with the reasoning of the Court's
opinion which was delivered by Mr. Justice Black.
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involved. It was this question which the Ninth Circuit in the Ala-
meda case had answered by finding that Erie applied and it was
this same question, too, which the Supreme Court itself had side-
stepped in the Bethlehem Steel case .7 In Priebe & Sons v. United
States"M the issue was squarely presented and decided. In that case
the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation (FSCC) had entered
into a contract with Priebe & Sons, Inc. for the purchase of dried
eggs for shipment to England and Russia under Lend Lease. The
contract contained two provisions concerning "liquidated damages";
one dealt with delays in delivery and was not applicable in this
case because deliveries were timely. The other provision provided
for the payment of "liquidated damages" if the contractor failed to
have the specified quantities of eggs inspected and ready for de-
livery on the date named in the offer. As a matter of fact, on that
date the contractor had not had the eggs inspected, although they
were inspected and delivered by the time delivery was actually
called for. When the FSCC discovered this fact, it deducted from
its payments to the contractor the amount specified in the contract
as "liquidated damages" and the contractor brought this suit in the
Court of Claims to recover the amount so withheld plus interest.
The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, first decided
the question of what law should apply by stating summarily:
It is customary, where Congress has not adopted a
different standard, to apply to the construction of govern-
ment contracts the principles of general contract law."
The majority then decided that under "principles of general
contract law" such a provision for liquidated damages was invalid
because since the government suffered noAijury and there was no
delay in delivery it was in reality a penalty rather than an
attempt to fix compensation for an anticipated loss. Being a penalty
it would not be enforced. Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice
Murphy agreed, dissented on the ground that since Congress had
nowhere, in the various statutes authorizing federal agents to enter
into contracts, expressly or impliedly forbade the inclusion of such
clauses, he could not see why their inclusion in arm's length con-
tracts should be nullified because of the Supreme Court's "invoca-
tion of a nebulous 'general contract law'.181 Justice Black, however,
prefaced his dissent with the statement that he regarded the deci-
sions of the Court since the Erie case, "as having established that
the construction and validity of all Government contracts are gov-
78U. S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
7968 Sup. Ct. 123 (1947).
so Id. at 125.
81 Id. at 127.
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erned by federal law, whether executed under authority of the
Lend-Lease Act or any other." 2
This series of cases would appear to have crystallized a definite
exception to the Erie doctrine. If it is correct to say that the Erie
doctrine is-linfled to cases where federal jurisdiction is grounded
on diversity then, of course, this line of cases could be explained
on that ground alone. The Supreme Court, however, has not based
its decisions on that somewhat narrow ground. This exception to
the Erie case is also, of course, explicitly recognized by Justice
Brandeis in his opinion in that case where he says:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitu-
tion or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State.23
The Supreme Court, however, had apparently felt that there
is an additional and perhaps even more forceful reason for departing
from the Erie doctrine in cases where the United States is a party
and where its civil rights, interests or legal relations are involved.8 '
It is the fact that when the Government's civil rights or its interests
as a contracting party are involved it may be important as a matter
of policy that there be a uniform rule throughout the forty-eight
states.
82Id. at 219. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate dissent, in
which the Chief Justice joined. His view was, in substance, that although
he would agree with the majority that in ordinary times the silence of
Congress would indicate a desire to have its contracts governed by "ordi-
nary rules of contract law," these were not ordinary times and, therefore,
he would find an implied authorization of a wider power'for federal con-
tracting agents operating during an emergency under such unusual
legislation.
83 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This statement how-
ever, was somewhat enigmatic and confused the Ninth Circuit in the
Alameda case, as to what should be done where the Federal Constitution
or the federal statute shed absolutely no light on the problem before the
court. In such a case which involves "judicial legislation" rather than
"interpretation," the Ninth Circuit, erroneously as it turned out, decided
that Justice Brandeis' exception was not applicable.
84 Judge Yank-wich had foreseen in 1940 with almost prescient insight
the line which the Supreme Court was to take in these cases. See supra
note 68. At least one lower federal court has adopted this same line of
reasoning in questions involving the ownership and rights in United States
savings bonds. In United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp.
73 (M.D. Pa. 1943) it was held that feder law and not state law determines
the ownership of such savings bonds in a decedent's estate. The district
court said at page 77, "This constitutes another example in the constantly
increasing list of cases where application of the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, supra, will lead to more confusion in the Federal law."
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Although there may be situations, as in Royal Indemnity Co.
v. United States,85 where even in cases such as these the federal
court may select as the federal rule the state law, there are also
other cases where federal policy may, in the opinion of the courts,
compel, as a practical matter, a uniform rule throughout the coun-
try. In the Clearfield Trust case, e.g., the Supreme Court felt that
as a matter of administrative practicality in the federal govern-
ment's issuance of commercial paper, federal officials should be
able to rely on one uniform rule throughout the United States. The
Court apparently placed a great deal of weight on this point as has
been noted from language previously quoted. 6
At least one strong reason for this exception to Erie therefore
is the desire of the federal courts to retain within their power the
right to determine the rules to be applied, in order that they may
insure uniformity in those cases where it is believed federal admin-
istrative efficiency or convenience make uniformity desirable.
In a quite recent case,87 the Supreme Court has extended this
doctrine to a case in which the non-contraetual or tortious relations
of the United States as a party are involved. The problem pre-
sented was whether the government could recover from the Oil Co.,
as a tortfeasor, the amounts expended by the government for hos-
85 Supra note 73. But even in that case compare Mr. Justice Black
(with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy concurred) dis-
senting: "I am of opinion that since our 'judicial law-making' is and must
be national in its scope, the law which we adopt fixing a rate of interest
for transactions such as that here involved should operate with uniformity
throughout the nation."
86 Supra note 11 at 367. The soundness of this view might be queried
in view of the fact that conversely it requires the local merchant, banker
or other citizen who receives government commercial paper in the course
of his business to be familiar with two sets of rules governing commercial
paper. It might also be suggested that large national industrial or com-
mercial concerns issuing their commercial paper are faced with the same
practical problems as is the federal government, but are not provided with
any such set of uniform rules upon which they may rely. There is in this
view, perhaps more than a hint of the traditional concept of the rights of
the sovereign over and above the rights of the citizen-a concept which in
another setting (the immunity of the sovereign from suit without consent)
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has recently characterized as a doctrine which is
"an anachronistic survival of monarchical privilege and runs counter to
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State. Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm., 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946). Whether or not,
as a matter of policy, the sovereign in its ordinary business dealings should
be governed by a different set of rules than those applicable to ordinary
citizens in the same sort of transactions, such nevertheless seems to be the
present view of the federal courts. For an indication of the English viewJ/ on this point, see King v. International Trustee, A.C. 500 (1937).
87United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 67 Sup. Ct. 1604
(1947).
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pitalization and soldier's pay for a soldier injured through the
negligence of the Oil Co.
The first question which the court had to determine was
whether state or federal law governed. In determining that this
was a matter of federal law- in which, in the absence of an appli-
cable Act of Congress, it was for the federal court to fashion the
governing rule according to its own standards, the Court rendered
a somewhat elaborate and quite instructive dissertation on the
limitations of Erie.88 In addition, the Court felt that, quite aside
from the inapplicability of Erie, a matter so distinctly federal as
the government-soldier relationship and one which involved federal
fiscal policy there was every reason policywise to ignore state law
and establish a uniform national rule.
Having so decided the Court then determined that in absence
of congressional action there is no cause of action in favor of the
Government against a third party who has injured one of its
servants. 9
It is evident that in all of these cases the evil of opposing re-
sults which Erie was fashioned to prevent is absent and so the pur-
pose behind Erie is not defeated by ignoring it in this type of case.
This exception to Erie then, if exception it is, is probably amply
justified both in logic and policy.
III. Cases which do not involve the civil rights; interests or
legal relations of the United States as a party, but in which the
jurisdiction of the federal court is based on a federal statute.
This type of case, of course, falls within Justice Brandeis' own
qualification of Erie0 once the question raised by the Ninth Circuit
in the Alameda County91 case has been answered successfully. That
is since these cases, by definition, arise under a federal statute, they
are not within the ambit of Erie unless Justice Brandeis meant that
his exception was only applicable when the provision of the Consti-
tution or the Act of Congress involved dealt specifically with the
problem before the Court. The Ninth Circuit in the Alameda
County case, so interpreted Brandeis' statement. The Supreme
88It is somewhat illuminating that the Court's opinion was delivered
by Mr. Justice Rutledge and that in the course thereof he expressly says
that Erie is limited to cases of diversity jurisdiction. In D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. F.D.LC., 315 U.S. 447 (1942), this same Justice again speaking for
the Court had purposely sidestepped this question, although Mr. Justice
Jackson in a concurring opinion had urged upon the Court the view now
enunciated by Justice Rutledge in the instant case.
89 Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, but wrote no
separate opinion. Mr. Justice Jackson dissented, but merely on the ground
that the Court should have imposed liability.
go Supra note 69.
91 Supra note 65.
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Court, however, was not long in fashioning a different theory. An
early post-Erie case, Deitrick v. Greaney, 2 involved an action
brought by a receiver of a national banking association to compel
payment of a promissory note. The Court refused to accept a de-
fense on the note raised by the defendant which was based on
local law. The Court brushed aside the Erie argument, by stating
and thus deciding:
But it is the federal statute which condemns as un-
lawful respondents' acts. The extent -and nature of the
legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by the
statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless to be de-
riedTf6m it and -the federal policy which it has adopted.93
In the case of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F. D. I. C.,94 the facts
involved a suit by the FDIC on a note given to a bank by the
defendant. The defendant had had a secret agreement with the
bank that the note would not be enforced. The defenses on the
note were lack of consideration because of the agreement and that
the FDIC was not a holder in due course. The majority decided
the case in favor of the FDIC on the basis of federal law relying
on the analogy of Deitrick v. Greaney. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, felt that since the law of either of the two states which
might have been applicable would have led to the result reached
by the majority, it was not necessary and therefore not wise to
base the decision on "federal law".
It was Mr. Justice Jackson, however, who in his concurring
opinion faced squarely the Erie question. He first posed the problem
as follows:
I think we should attempt a more explicit answer to
the question whether federal or state law governs our de-
cision in this sort of case than is found either in the opinion
of the Court or in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter."
He then answered the question thus posed:
I do not understand Justice Brandeis' statement in Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 at 78, that 'There is no fed-
eral general common law,' to deny that the common law
may in proper cases be an aid to, or the basis of, decision
of federal questions.96
A federal court sitting in a non-diversity case such as
this does not sit as a local tribunal. In some cases it may
see fit for special reasons to give the law of a particular
state highly persuasive or even controlling effect, but in the
92309 U.S. 190 (1940).
93 Id. at 200.
94 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
" Id. at 465.
96 Id. at 469, 470.
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last analysis its descision turns upon the law of the United
States, not that of any state. Federal law is no juridical
chameleon, changing complexion to match that of each state
wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the
accidents of service of process and of the application of the
venue statutes. It is found in the federal Constitution,
statutes or common law. Federal common law implements
the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply
the traditional common-law technique of decision and to
draw upon all the sources of the common law in cases such
as the present. Board of Commissioners v. United States,
308 U.S. 343, 350.-1
The Supreme Court thus adopted the idea that where jurisdic-
tion is based on a federal statute then all problems arising in con-.
nection therewith (whether dealt with by the statute or not) are
matters for judicial determination by the federal courts as matters
of federal common law and the Erie doctrine has no application.
It was only to a very limited extent that Erie had deprived the
federal courts of their power to legislate interstitially, if we may
paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes' apt remark.98
In Heiser v. Woodruff:9 9 the Court dealt with bankruptcy and
decided that nothing in Erie "requires a court of bankruptcy, in ap-
plying the Statutes of the United States governing the liquidation
of bankrupts' estates, to adopt local rules of law in determining
what claims are provable, or to be allowed, or how the bankrupts'
estate is to be distributed among claimants."'100
In cases arising under federal statutes, of course, the Black and
9 Id. at 4J-1?972-
9 In Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946), a suit was brought
against certain bank stockholders under a section of the Federal Farm Loan
Act making such stockholders liable for a 100% assessment. The defendant
contended that the action was barred by the New York State ten year
statute of limitations which applies when no other limitation is specifically
prescribed. The Supreme Court held that a federally created equitable
right could not be barred by a state statute where the result would be
inequitable as it was felt it would in this case. A comparison of this case
with Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), will amply illustrate
the difference in approach to the same question in the Erie and non-Erie
case.
99327 U.S. 726 (1946).
100 Id. at 731. The same view had been previously expressed by the
Court in Wragg v. Federal Land Bank df New Orleans, 317 U.S. 325
(1943). See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 281
(1946). There is, however, nothing in these cases which necessarily says
that in the appropriate case, the federal court cannot apply state law;
these cases do no more than decide that matters ,arising under the bank-
ruptcy laws are federal questions to be decided by the federal courts
without regard to the Erie doctrine.
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White Taxicablol type of situation could not arise and the policy
basis underlying Erie was not present so it is not surprising that
the Erie doctrine was early ignored." 2 The present state of the
cases can perhaps be summarized as follows: if jurisdiction is based
on a federal statute the judicial determinations are always matters
of federal law, made without reference to the Erie doctrine, but
since a federal statute is involved it is the statute which will govern'
the applicable law as well as all other questions. If, therefore, the
statute expressly or by implication directs that the state law be
followed, the federal court must, of course, as a matter of federal
law, follow the applicable state law. The federal court also may, as
in the Royal Indemnity case;10 3 determine the federal rule by refer-
ence to the state law if that appears appropriate in a given case.10
If the federal court in a given situation feels that policywise it
would be best to follow the state law it can usually do so by finding
the "necessary implication" in the federal statute involved. If the
court feels otherwise and the statute is silent, the question is still
a matteroif~federal law" for "federal determination". 10 5
An interesting question, which has not yet reached the Supreme
Court, has arisen in connection with some of the lower court deci-
sions under the Miller Act.0 6 This Act was passed for the protec-
tion of subcontractors, suppliers of material, etc., to contractors
holding government contracts and permits them to tap a source of
101 Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab Co.,
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
102 In fact uniformity of decision between state and federal courts (the
real point of Erie) is furthered by this line of thought because, as will be
developed infra, p. 306, in cases where a federal statute is involved the
federal rule governs whether the case be in the federal court solely on
diversity grounds or even if it is brought in the state court.
103 313 U.S. 289 (1941).
104 This thought is well expressed in a tax case, Helvering v. Stuart,
317 U.S. 154, 161 (1942): "The intention of Congress controls what law
federal or state, is to be applied. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110;
Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 194. Since the federal revenue laws are de-
signed for a national scheme of taxation, their provisions are not to be
deemed subject to state law 'unless the language or necessary implication
of the section involved' so requires. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399,
402-3. This decision applied federal definition to determine whether an
interest in property was called a 'future interest.' When Congress fixes a
tax on the possibility of the revesting of property or the distribution of in-
come, the 'necessary implication' we think, is that the possibility is to be
determined by the state law." This statement of judicial attitude is
equally applicable to all federal statutes and reflects the federal courts'
approach whether the statute in question be taxation, bankruptcy or other.
105 The cases which have arisen to date under the various federal
statutes have been collected in a Note in 59 HAv. L. REv. 966 (1946). See
also Annotation, 140 A.L-A.R 711 (1942).
106 40 U.S.C.A. Secs. 270a, 270b and 270c (1943).
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indemnification not otherwise directly open to them. The suits are
brought by the subcontractors, etc. under Section 2b of the Act
which provides that:
Every suit instituted under this section shall be
brought in the name of the United States for the use of the
person suing, in the United States District Court for any
district in which the contract was to be performed and ex-
ecuted and not elsewhere.
Thus, although there may or may not be diversity of citizen-
ship, the basis for federal jurisdiction is the federal statute rather
than diversity. Inasmuch as the suit is on a contract concerning
which the statute says nothing, most lower federal courts have felt
that Erie controls and state law must govern, despite the fact that
federal jurisdiction is grounded on a federal statute.0 7 At least one
other federal court, however, relying on the fact that these cases
are brought under a federal statute, has held that Erie has no ap-
plication. 0 8 The facts that the construction of the federal statute
is in no way involved and that usually the laws of the state where
the federal court is sitting are, as one court has put it, "both lex
Zoci contractus and lex fori",109 are strong reasons for applying the
laws of the state rather than fashioning a different rule. It is sub-
mitted, however, that those courts which have applied the local law
on the ground of an Erie mandate have perhaps reached a correct
result, but for the wrong reasons. It would be more symmetrical
and perhaps more logical to say that there is a federal statute and
therefore federal law governs, but that the "necessary implication"
from the statute, is that Congress intended that the federal courts
should follow the applicable local rule. The reasons recited by the
courts for applying Erie would, it is suggested, be equally opposite
for finding the "necessary implications" in the statute.
A more difficult and perlexing problem, and one that has also
not yet been entirely clarified by the Supreme Court, is presented
by the unfair competition cases. These cases may arise when an
action is brought in the federal court on the basis of a federal
statute for infringement of a copyright, or a trademark and there
is joined with it a second cause of action for unfair competion based
1
0 7 In United States v. Henke Construction Co., 157 F 2d 13 (C.C.A.
8th 1946), e.g., the court said: "While the present action is brought under a
federal statute it is in the nature of an action on contract and the considera-
tion of the federal statute is not involved." The court then went on to hold
that Erie as extended and applied by the Klaxon case was applicable. To
the same effect see United States, ex rel. Gillioz v. John Kerns Construction
Co., 50 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Ark. 1943); United States v. Blair, 147 F. 2d 840
(C.C.A. 8th 1945).
108 Liebman v. United States, 153 F. 2d 350, (C.C.A. 9th 1946).
109 United States, ex rel. Gillioz v. John Kerns Construction Co., supra
note 107.
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on substantially the same facts as those involved in the infringe-
ment issue.110 They may also arise when the unfair competition
action is brought alone as a common law action and federal juris-
diction is based solely on diversity of citizenship grounds. In this
latter type case, however, the Supreme Court has decided that Erie
applies and local law governs."'
Two problems are raised in the Hum v. Oursler= class of
cases. First is what law governs in the infringement case itself.
This would not appear too difficult and in line with the cases pre-
viously discussed it would seem that, there being a federal act in-
volved, "a federal common law rather than a local common law
should be applied in formulating a gloss for, or filling a lacuna, in
the act."1 3 The Supreme Court, however, has not yet passed on the
point. In the Pecheur Co. v. National Candy Co. case,114 the Supreme
Court asked for argument on the point of whether local or federal
law should be applied (both the district and the circuit courts hav-
ing failed to consider or apply local law) in a suit for infringement
under the Trademark Act of 1905. When the case was briefed in
the Supreme Court, however, it was discovered for the first time
that the complaint had alleged that the suit was grounded on a
registered trademark when actually the registration was under the
Copyright Law. In view of this, the Court concluded that the only
cause of action which the record would support would be a common
law one of unfair competition and trademark infringement and that
was clearly governed by "local law". The case was therefore re-
manded for application of the appropriate local law.
Whatever decision is reached on the question arising under the
federal statute, there is still the problem of what law should gov-
ern the second cause of action for common law "unfair competition"
which only slips into a federal court on the coattails of the truly
federal action by being within the ambit of the Oursier case. Both
of these questions have been the subject of much scholarly discus-
110 It was Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) that had decided that
where claims of infringement (under a federal statute) and unfair competi-
tion (common law) rest on identical facts a federal court having properly
gained jurisdiction in the first cause of action may retain jurisdiction to
try the second even though there is no diversity of citizenship or other basis
for federal jurisdiction.
J1' Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942).
See also Fashion Guild v. Trade Commission, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
112 Supra note 110.
I's This phrase is borrowed from Judge Wyzanski's opinion in Na-
tional Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass.




sion"I' as well as no little judicial treatment. Probably the most
thorough analysis of the matter by a court, to date, was that made
by Judge Wyzanski in the National Fruit Product Co. case." 6 In
that case Judge Wyzanski first decided that the question of in-
fringement of registered trademarks is a matter of federal law. In
this view the District Judge seems to be corroborated by most if
not all the cases thus far decided on the point.117 In considering the
second point of the unfair competition cause of action appended to
the infringment claim, Judge Wyzanski carefully weighed the argu-
ments propounded by Zlinkoff,"18 and others in favor of applying a
federal common law to the unfair competition claim. He said:
There is an anomaly in the same tribunal applying to
the same set of facts at the same time two different rules
of law. Moreover, where a federally registered mark is in-
volved, the problem of unfair competition, by hypothesis,
involves commerce among several states, and alleged torts
in several states. In such a case reference to the law of the
state where the United States court sits requires a consid-
eration not only of local tort rules, but also of local state
rules of conflict of laws, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477; and if
those local state rules of conflict of laws were those set
forth in American Law Institute, Restatement, Conflicts,
Sec. 378, 383, 384, then the United States Court would be
required to frame its opinion, mould its decree and assess
damages for each state where the alleged tort occurred.
R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 2 Cir., 114 F. 2d 86, 89 col. 2;
Triangle Publications v. New England Newspaper Publish-
ing Co., D. C. Mass., 46 F. Supp. 198, 203. See Note, 41 Col.
L. Rev. 1403. Again, in many states there is, because of the
long reign of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865, now in
existence no body, or at least no modern body, of local law
of unfair competition. Reference to local law would some-
times be reference to archaic decisions. At other times it
would be meaningless because there would be no local de-
cisions and the federal courts would have to indulge in a
presumption that local courts, when the matter came before
them, would follow federal decisions and text books, citing
exclusively federal decisions. Cf. Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113, 59 S. Ct. 109, 83 L. Ed. 73, note
1. Finally, unfair competition is under modern conditions of
115 See e.g. for an exhaustive treatment of the subject, Zlinkoff, Erie v.
Tompkins: In Relation to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition.
42 COL. L. RV. 955 (1942). See also, Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv.
L. REV. 1289. (1940).
116 Supra note 113.
117 Judge Wyzanski's decision was affirmed by his own superiors in 140
F. 2d 618 (C.C.A. 1st 1944), see also Time, Inc. v. Vioblin Corp. 128 F. 2d
860 (C.C.A. 7th 1942) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 673 (1942); Philco Corp. v.
Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. 2d 663 (C.C.A. 7th 1943).
118 See note 115 supra.
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national commerce a subject adapted for national, uniform
treatment, more particularly since large investments have
been made on the faith of the broad protection the federal
courts developed between 1900 and Tompkins' case in 1938.
Cf. Robert S. Lynd, The People As Consumers, Report of
President Hoover's Research Committee on Recent Social
Trends in the United States, vol. II, ch. XXII, p. 876.119
Judge Wyzanski concludes, however, that these arguments are
not overly persuasive. As to the argument that there may be a con-
flict problem involving forty-eight states, the Judge doubts if the
states will adopt a "checker-board jurisprudence" and until that
happens the Klaxon case will not force the federal courts to do so.
He further concludes that the absence of state decisions because of
the reign of Swift v. Tyson, however true it may be of other states,
does not apply to Massachusetts. Finally the point that national
commerce requires national rules on this subject, he feels is a matter
for Congress and not the courts to implement. Judge Wyzanski's
ultimate decision that local law should apply seems to find authori-
tative support by implication at least from the Supreme Court in
the Pecheur Lozenge Co., Inc. v. National Candy Co.,120 and the
other lower federal courts have also veered strongly in this direc-
tion.12 .
Certainly any other result would be inconsistent with the trend
in the strictly Erie situations heretofore discussed and would be
difficult, if not impossible to reconcile with the uniformity philos-
ophy which underlies the Erie decision.
IV. Cases which arise in a state court or in which the basis of
the jurisdiction of the federal court is diversity of citizenship but
119 Supra note 113, National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co.,
47 F. Supp. 499, 503-04 (D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F. 2d 618 (C.C.A. 1st 1944).
Judge Clark in his article, State Law in the Federal Courts, supra, lays
great stress on what he terms the "federal specialties," in which he includes
cases of unfair competition based on trademark infringement. He concludes,
however, that the fears expressed by those who urge the federal law
approach are probably more fanciful than real and that, "Except for some
slight nuances of emphasis, this law may well be much the same whether
expounded by state or federal judges." For a good example of the practical
operation of this idea, see Judge Clark's opinion in Lucien Lelong Inc. v.
Lander Co., Inc., 164 F. 2d 395 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), affirming, 67 F. Supp. 997
(S.D. N.Y. 1947).
120See note 111 supra.
121 See e.g. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco
Rubber Co., 55 F. Supp. 308 (D. Mass. 1944) and Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellogg
Sales Co., 143 F. 2d 895 (C.C.A. 8th 1944), affirming 52 F. Supp. 432 (D.
Neb. 1943), cert denied, 323 U.S. 766 (1944).
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where a question is raised involving the Constitution or a federal
statute.
These cases, of course, present the opposite side of the coin. If
whenever a federal act is involved federal law, rather than local
law, shall apply "in formulating a gloss for, or filling a lacuna, in
the act", then consistency and uniformity would require that the
federal rule should also govern whenever a federal statute is- in-
directly involved, even if the basis fox federal jurisdiction is solely
diversity or -ven - the case-arises in a state court. To reach any
other result would do violence to the Erie tenet of uniformity.
In a very recent case 2 2 the Supreme Court recognized this
principle. In that case a suit was brought by guardians of minor
children to recover damages from the railroad for the death of
the father, who was killed while riding on a train of the defendant.
Jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship. The deceased
had been riding on a free pass which provided by its terms that the
user assumed all risk of injury to person or property whether by
negligence or otherwise and the user absolved the issuing company
from liability therefor. Under the applicable local law (Utah) re-
covery is permitted against a railroad when its negligence was re-
sponsible for a passenger's death, whether that passenger rides on
a free pass containing an attempted waiver of liability for negli-
gence or pays his fare in money. The Hepburn Act,123 however,
one of the various statutes regulating interstate commerce, deals
with "free passes" on interstate carriers. As early as 1904, even
before the Hepburn Act, the Supreme Court had held that a pro-
vision in a "free pass" similar to the one in the instant case ab-
solved the railroad from liability caused by ordinary negligence. 2 4
The Hepburn Act was passed in 1906 and limited the cases in which
"free passes" could be issued and after that Act the course of de-
cisions remained consistent with the Adams case. 1 25 In 1940 the
statutes dealing with railroads were revamped and the free pass
provisions were modified only to permit free transportation to ad-
ditional classes of persons-no changes were made in the estab-
lished judicial interpretation. In view of this history the court de-
termined that the issuance of free passes and the judicial deter-
mination of their legal effect was a federal matter to the exclusion
22- Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 68 S. Ct. 611 (1948).
123 34 STAT. 584 (1906); 49 U.S.C. §1 (1940).
24 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904).
122 Ibid.
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of state law and Erie had no application.12 6 The majority further
determined that since Congress had amended the Act without chang-
ing the judicial decisions relevant thereto, those judicial determina-
tions had in fact become part of the Act and therefore the rule as
expressed in the Adams case was the federal law which must be
followed. Mr. Justice Black was joined by Justices Murphy and
Rutledge in dissenting. The ground of the dissent seemed to be,
first, that no Act of Congress had invaded the power of the state
of Utah to provide damages for this kind of wrongful death and
therefore, since Erie, if Utah law would permit recovery, the fed-
eral courts were bound to follow that law. The dissent went on to
say, however, that even if this case were to be governed by federal
law they could not agree with the majority that the Adams case was
necessarily binding on them as the federal rule and they would
reexamine that rule in the light of today and would overrule it.
The majority indicated that the federal rule of the Adams case
would by virtue of the Supremacy Clause have to be followed by
a state court should the case have arisen there.1 27 This result, of
course, is a necessary and logical extension of the majority's rea-
soning and despite the rumblings of the dissent over the primary
conclusion of the majority the principle that when the interpreta-
tion of a federal statute or provision of the United States Constitu-
126 For an earlier unanimous decision on the same point see Sola Elec-
tric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) which involved a suit in which
diversity of citizenship was the basis for federal jurisdiction. In that case
the plaintiff alleged that it was the owner of a certain patent, that it had
entered into a license contract with the defendant to manufacture trans-
formers under the patent on payment of a royalty and that the agreement
had contained a provision that the price of transformers sold by the de-
fendant were not to be more favorable than the prices and other conditions
prescribed by the plaintiff for its own sales and those of its other licensees.
Defendant challenged certain features of the patent and asserted that for
that reason the price control features of the agreement rendered the agree-
ment invalid and the plaintiff could not recover. The plaintiff replied that
the defendant was estopped to challenge the price-fixing clause by showing
that the patent is invalid and the price restriction accordingly invalid be-
cause not protected by the patent monopoly. The lower courts had agreed
that the defendant by accepting the licensing agreement was estopped from
denying the validity of the patent. The Supreme Court, however, in an
unanimous opinion reversed, saying that the price fixing agreement was
illega under the Sherman Act unless it is coupled with a valid patent and
since a federaI statut-e is, therefore, involved) the ]ws--of---I1-inois-as to
whether or not there would be estoppel are not applicable. The Court said
that this was a matter of federal law to be decided-by the federal courts.
The Court then went on to decide that to permit an estoppel would be to
thwart the purpose of the Sherman Act and so denied it.
127 In fact the Court cited with approval a case in the Adams line of
decisions which had arisen in a state court in which this result had been
reached. Kansas City So. R. Co. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S. 459 (1923).
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tion is in some manner involved in a case arising in a state court or
in a federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the interpretation of
the federal problem must be made in line with federal rather than
state rules seems to be presently the law.1 28 Certainly symmetry,
consistency and the logic of Erie would all have been ignored had
the Court come to any other conclusion.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court, in the ten years since Erie,
has gone quite far in clarifying the extent and limits of that some-
what enigmatic decision. The Erie doctrine applies only to those
cases where jurisdiction is grounded upon diversity of citizenship
and even there if a "federal question" is raised, state law will not be
binding as authority on the federal courts. Where federal jurisdic-
tion is founded on grounds other than diversity of citizenship there
is still a "federal common law." If in deciding the issues, the fed-
eral courts follow the state law where by federal statute, or the
Constitution, the question is left to judicial implementation, it is not
because Erie so requires. Rather, state law is followed because the
court finds in the statute a direction either express or by "necessary
implication" to that effect, or the court determines as a matter of
federal law that it will adopt as the federal rule the pertinent state
law.
In the solution of questions involving federal statutes or the
Constitution, the federal rule governs even though the case may
arise initially in the state courts. In these situations it is evident
that the desideratum of uniformity which undoubtedly underlies
Erie is fulfilled rather than frustrated. Similarly, this same aim can
be detected in the Supreme Court's approach to the strictly Erie
cases where jurisdiction is based on diversity. In those cases, the
touchstone is uniformity of result. Formalistic concepts of sub-
stance and procedure are to be swept away so that all rights derived
solely from the state may be, within the framework of our federal
system, adjudicated in the federal courts with substantially the
same result as would obtain in the state court across the street or
a block away.
128sn Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) a case
arising in the courts of the state of Pennsylvania was reversed by the
Supreme Court because of the failure of the state court to apply federal
rather than local law in a suit by a seaman under Section 33 of the Mer-
chant Marine Act (46 U.S.C. §688). The Court said at page 245: "The
constant objective of legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants full
protection for all substantive rights intended to be afforded them by the
jurisdiction in which the right itself originates. Not so long ago we sought
to achieve this result with respect to enforcement in the federal courts of
rights created or governed by state law." Cf. United States v. Waddell,
323 U.S. 353 (1945).
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